Write on what will be called: Exchangeability: the reason for the explanatory gap

The twin Earth example works for ordinary scenarios to explain referential meaning. The example, however, falls apart when we question the perfect exchangeability of the scenarios, since there is certainly a way in which we could distinguish XYZ from H2O. This may be used to argue, that, even though meaning is referential, one may still use evaluative processes to ensure that one is referring to the same thing as another. This is because, in the processes that are being talked about, there is not an absolute exchangeability between sets of possible worlds and *observable* properties, even if there is exchangeability between sets of possible worlds and *observed* properties. However, there do exist domains in which the observable properties of possible worlds are perfectly exchangeable, but in which the substance being referenced may be imagined to vary. I will therefore use this means of analysis to help us to understand the nature of language as referential, as well as the nature of these exchangeable worlds themselves.

Exchangeable worlds include:

* Other minds and external phenomena
* Skeptical cases such as the brain-in-a-vat scenario
* Any situation in which the difference between epistemically different worlds cannot be metaphysically distinguished

Micro-macro problem is a problem of complexity and emergence, not of unexplanation